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How long can government budget deficits continue unchecked? This question raises two separate issues. First, are perpetual deficits desirable-are the effects on inflation, investment, and the balance of payments ones that we can live with? Second, are perpetual deficits feasible-even if the government wanted to run a budget deficit forever, is this something it really could do?
If we were talking about the budget plans of a private household, clearly the question of feasibility would be paramount, for we entertain little doubt that households would like to run a permanent deficit if they could get away with it, continually rolling over debt without having to pay anything back and enjoying the associated free lunch. We presume that households do not generally engage in such behavior primarily for the reason of feasibility-no one would be willing to continue lending money to such a household. For this reason, we usually specify that households are subject to the borrowing constraint that the expected present value of expenditures (exclusive of interest payments) not exceed the expected present value of receipts.
The question we pose in this paper is whether governments are subject to an analogous constraint-when a government runs a deficit, is it making an implicit promise to creditors that it will run offsetting surpluses in the future? If governments are subject to this constraint, which we will term the present-value borrowing constraint, the policy of running a permanent deficit (exclusive of interest payments) is infeasible; (though, as we shall see below, a permanent deficit when interest payments are counted as part of the deficit may still be feasible). The question of feasibility of a permanent deficit (exclusive of interest payments) holds profound implications for macroeconomic theory and practice. If governments intend to raise the needed revenues with future tax increases, then government deficits may have no stimulative effect on aggregate demand,' but can have significant distortionary effects on private incentives if the future tax increases are large (see Robert Barro, 1984b ). On the other hand, if the revenues are to be raised implicitly through money creation, budget deficits can be a principal cause of inflation, as suggested by Thomas Sargent (1982) and Sargent and Neil Wallace (1981) .
Whether governments can continually run a budget deficit remains an unsettled theoretical question. If the government borrows at an interest rate that equals or exceeds the economy's growth rate, then a continuing unpaid deficit implies that the debt must grow to become an infinite multiple of GNP.2 Equilibrium models in which investors would continue to buy government debt under such circumstances have proven difficult to develop; see Bennett McCallum (1984) for a clear discussion of the issues. If the real interest rate is less than the growth rate, by contrast, deficits could continue forever without an increase in the ratio of debt to GNP. Theoretical models that seem to allow this possibility have been explored by Willem Buiter (1979) In any case, it seems desirable to supplement these theoretical considerations with empirical evidence. David Aschauer (1985) and John Seater and Roberto Mariano (1985) , among others, have tested the hypothesis that the government's receipts must equal its expenditures in present-value terms jointly with a permanent income hypothesis, and accepted. Paul Evans (1985) documented the absence of statistical correlation between U.S. budget deficits and interest rates, which he interpreted as evidence in support of this same joint hypothesis. Barro (1984b) tested the hypothesis that the government is subject to the present-value borrowing constraint jointly with the assumption that taxation and deficit policies have historically been optimal, and again accepted. However, to our knowledge there has been no direct empirical test of the presentvalue borrowing constraint itself.
At first glance, a test of the present-value borrowing constraint might seem straightforward enough. The U.S. government, for example, has run more or less a chronic deficit since 1930, suggesting that permanent deficits are quite feasible and practical. However, this simple argument ignores the potential role of debt retirement through monetization and likewise ignores capital gains on bonds or tangible assets through inflation. Moreover, the official government deficit includes interest payments, whereas we will argue below that the correct magnitude for purposes of testing the present-value borrowing constraint should exclude such payments. Finally, a formal test of whether historical deficits were rationally anticipated and allowance for what might rationally be expected to happen out of sample seems necessary to evaluate this hypothesis adequately.
In this paper we propose an empirical framework for testing the practical limits to public borrowing which addresses these criticisms. We show that the proposition that the government can accumulate ever-growing debt through perpetual deficit financing has a mathematical parallel in the propositio-n that prices can rise continually in a self-fulfilling speculative bubble. Thus, empirical tests that have been developed for the latter hypothesis may also be fruitfully applied to study the limits of govemment borrowing.
The conclusions we draw from these tests complement those of Barro (1984a) and Robert Eisner and Paul Pieper (1984) , who have noted that while the official budget has registered a chronic deficit, the real value of government debt fell substantially in the postwar period, suggesting that the official accounts have grossly misstated the true fiscal posture of the government. Once an economically reasonable definition of the government budget deficit is adopted, the data seem fully compatible with the assertion that the government budget historically has been balanced in expected present-value terms. Our tests show this conclusion to be reasonably robust with respect to specification of the information on which creditors were basing their forecasts of future surpluses. 
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Past deficits have been followed by increases in revenues which covered the government's interest obligations, though the implicit "inflation tax" has historically made an important contribution. Section I provides a formal statement of the present-value borrowing constraint to be tested. Section II briefly discusses some issues of data and measurement. In Section III we present the results of alternative empirical tests of whether the postwar record of budget deficits in the United States could be consistent with the present-value borrowing constraint under rational expectations, with brief conclusions offered in Section IV.
The Present-Value Government
Borrowing Constraint
Suppose we collected all government debt of a given coupon and maturity into group j. Let dy t denote the nominal market value of such debt at the end of period t and O0, the total nominal coupon payments between dates t -1 and t. We further let P, denote an aggregate price index of goods in the economy and r the ex post real interest rate that is earned on one-period government bonds during an average year.
Suppose no new bonds of type j are issued or redeemed during period t. Then changes in the market value of group j debt can be evaluated using a simple term-structure argument. Define V to be the real excess one-period holding yield of j bonds relative to the average earned on a comparable investment in one-period bonds:
(1) V;,- terms holds true if and only if A0 = 0 in equation (9). Equation (9) is mathematically equivalent to the models of self-fulfilling fads or speculative bubbles first explored by Robert Flood and Peter Garber (1980). We accordingly propose that such tests might also be fruitfully applied to understanding the limits of government borrowing. The next section discusses the data on which such tests might be based, while Section III summarizes our results.
II. Issues of Data and Measurement
This section, inspired in part by Barro (1984a) and Eisner and Pieper, briefly discusses how the theoretical magnitudes appearing in our equation (9) Some might argue that trust fund holdings are to be used against the government's liabilities implied by future Social Security benefit payments. It seems to us that this is an inaccurate interpretation. Such programs are not a current liability in the sense that they can be associated with any concrete number. Rather, they represent the outcome of an uncertain political process, and the correct way to represent this "liability" is by the discounted cash flow of an entry on current account rather than any dubious imputation to capital account. For this reason, we follow the official accounts in registering net Social Security inflows or outflows on the deficit account, but differ from the official accounts on the debt account. The correct measure subtracts that money which is owed from one branch of government to another. Suppose that these funds were indeed used primarily to issue market-interest loans to the private sector. Imagine the agency issuing a $1 loan financed through a $1 sale of Treasury bonds, and so running an offbudget $1 deficit for that year. In the following year, the agency receives $r as interest payments from the private sector, but the Treasury pays $r back to the public as interest on the T bond. For this year, the official budget and off-budget items would accordingly sum to a zero net deficit. Thus, the 4To take a simple example, suppose that in year 1 spending exceeds taxes by $1, with the shortfall made up by $1 issue of new agency debt. In all subsequent years, interest spending is $r and taxes are correspondingly higher by $r. In the accounts as actually reported, this policy would be associated with a $1 deficit in year 1 and no surplus in subsequent years. In our proposed measure, by contrast, the deficit is zero in all years; i.e., agency debt has no effect on the present-value calculation for Treasury debt, as it should not in this case.
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present-value budget across the two years would register a deficit if one combined the official budget and off-budget items into a single account, whereas the operation itself is clearly fiscally neutral-the government issued a $1 Treasury bond but acquired a $1 private bond, and has simply swapped like assets with the public. A correct measure would be obtained in this case if we adopt our convention of excluding Treasury interest payments from G, and simply ignore the off-budget surplus or deficit altogether. Of course, these programs are not pure market loans but in fact have a substantial subsidy aspect. Our only justification for ignoring this is that it is difficult to quantify and presumably small relative to the complete budget.
D. Net Government Indebtedness
Eisner and Pieper have begun the difficult task of quantifying the market value of various tangible assets owned by the government. The question for purposes of the present study is, do government bondholders believe that future interest payments will really be met through sale of such assets, rather than by more conventional means such as tax revenues or monetization? Our own view is that, for the vast majority of these assets, the promise of substantial liquidation of government tangible assets is not a politically credible backing for U.S. Treasury debt.
One important exception is the government's gold holdings. There is abundant historical evidence that governments willingly draw down or deplete these stocks in the wake of fiscal crises; this indeed is presumably the primary purpose of holding such stocks in the first place. Let Aut denote the government's gold holdings in ounces, ptAu the price per ounce of gold, and Dt the nominal value of debt, all measured at the beginning of period t. Let PtSt denote the correctly measured surplus during period t (excluding interest payments from spending but making no correction for gold flows), and let it be the one-period interest rate, which for simplicity we assume is the same for all bonds. If at the end of period t the government sells off some amount of gold where B, and S, are the adjusted debt and surplus series reported in Table 2 and n, is a regression disturbance term reflecting expected changes in real short-term interest rates, the term structure of long rates, and measurement error. The operator E, denotes the expectations of creditors, which we assume are formed rationally. Equation (10) is mathematically equivalent to the model proposed by Flood and Garber for studying self-fulfilling hyperinflations. However, Hamilton and Charles Whiteman (1985) expanded on the caveat stated by Flood and Garber that their technique implicitly imposes strong restrictions on the variables used by agents in forming expectations E, and on the dynamics allowed for n,. Behzad Diba and Herschel Grossman (1984) and Hamilton and Whiteman suggested that a more general test should first be considered which is more robust with respect to such restrictions. In particular, for any stationary process for (n,, E,EJ1(1 + +), when AO = 0, B, will be stationary, whereas for Ao > 0, B, will not be stationary. We accordingly initially examine two simple tests. Using the data in Table 2 rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in both cases; that is, the data seem fully compatible with the assertion that investors rationally expected the budget to be balanced in present-value terms.
A. Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit

B. Generalized Flood-Garber Test
If expectations of future surpluses are conditioned in part on past surpluses and if we include lagged debt to eliminate the serial correlation of the resulting error term, then equation (10) Table 3 .
As in the less restrictive tests above, we note that there seems to be no role whatever for the bubble term; Ao is statistically insignificant, and, if anything, negative. The assumption that bondholders rationally expected the debt to be paid back in presentvalue terms fits the data better than the assumption that debt has simply accumulated with an ever-growing interest load. Moreover, for these parameter estimates, equation (15) has an R2 of 0.53; that is, more than half of the observed variance in the market value of real government debt 6The second assumption in particular is admittedly unrealistic. Indeed, it can be shown that expectations must be based on additional information besides S, (namely, on the exogenous shocks to which the endogenous policy variable S, responds) if equation (8) is to hold, because the forecast errors (E, -E, 1)S,,j cannot be fundamental for S,. It nevertheless seems of interest to see how good an approximation one gets to the data by ignoring this difference between the true forecasts of creditors (E,S,,j) and our econometric forecasts (ES,+j) based on a univariate autoregression for S,.
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could be explained from a rational expectations forecast of the discounted value of future surpluses. Note such high explanatory power is achieved despite the fact that all of the other parameters that characterize the dynamics of outstanding debt in equation (15) are tied down by the univariate process for surpluses (13), and such parameters appear in (15) only to the extent that they could characterize rational expectations forecasts of future surpluses. The high R2 is also achieved despite the omission of all of the additional variables besides past surpluses that would be used by agents to forecast future surpluses. Of course, to achieve such a fit to the data, the regression is forced to fit strongly negative coefficients in the autoregressive process for surpluses at two-and three-year lags, as the values in Table 3 The restricted rational expectations estimates of Table 3 simply exaggerate this feature in the data. Overall, then, the presentvalue hypothesis seems to hold up quite well.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the proposition that in order to be able to issue interest-bearing debt, a government must promise to balance its budget in expected present-value terms. We suggested a battery of empirical tests of this proposition, some of which are quite robust with respect to assumptions about the dynamics of variables that are seen by agents but not the econometrician, and others which are highly restrictive. The conclusion from all our tests, however, is the same-the proposition that the government must promise creditors that it will balance the budget in expected present-value terms seems largely consistent with postwar U.S. data. This result might seem surprising since the official budget accounts register essentially uninterrupted deficits for the United States from 1960 to 1981. However, the real value of government debt held by the public actually fell during this period, indicating that the continuing reported deficits grossly misstated the true fiscal posture of the government. We suggested an alternative measure of the government deficit that takes into account revenues from monetization and capital gains on gold but excludes interest payments. From the time-series properties of the adjusted deficit series, one can construct a rational expectations forecast of the present value of future government budget surpluses. Such a forecast series can account for 53 percent of the observed variance of real government debt under the assumption that the government budget must be balanced in present-value terms.
If our conclusion on the limitations of government borrowing is correct, then the prevailing sentiment in Washington that current deficits can continue forever is wrong; the adjusted deficit series must soon turn to surplus. One policy change that could turn the adjusted series to surplus would be a resurgence of money growth.
